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BOOK REVIEWS
Death and the Supreme Court.

By Barrett Prettyman, Jr.

New

York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962. Pp. 311. $4.95.
Barrett Prettyman's objective is the presentation to the public,
in a form understandable to the layman, of an accurate image of the
judges on the Supreme Court and something of the procedures and
policies which govern them. The author avoids the use of a single
citation. He presents the material simply and dramatically. Yet he
has managed to avoid the often fatal quality of over-simplification.
Mr. Prettyman shows that the Court justices are actually human
beings who feel deeply their responsibilities and bear the burden of
the frightening and sobering knowledge that they are the last bulwark
for many desperate and condemned men.
Also there is an attempt to impress the reader with the tremendous amount of time and work the judge must give to the task of
being a Supreme Court Justice. Mr. Justice Jackson once estimated
that if each case on an average list to be decided by the Court were
actually considered at conference, that case would receive only
thirty-three seconds of discussion from each justice. Thus they must
dismiss many of the cases simply due to lack of time to consider
them.
Amidst the many interesting details about the Supreme Court, a
secondary purpose of the author becomes apparent. He is crusading
for the abolition of the death sentence. He points out many cases
arising upon similar facts in which one person pays with his life
while another receives a life sentence. Often the reason for the
distinction between the two cases is nebulous.
The need for more books like Death and the Supreme Court is
obvious. It is not healthy for the nature and work of the Supreme
Tribunal of our land to be enshrouded in mystery because of books
and treatises which are too sophisticated for the layman to understand.
After all, it is the layman's Court too. Often the public is not given
a true picture of the justices and the workings of the Court by newspapers and magazines. The image is distorted. It becomes a tribunal which is either always right or always wrong. This picture
of the Supreme Court is augmented by the practice of the justices of
never explaining or publicly clarifying their position on a point.
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They do not have time to issue memorandum decisions giving reasons
why Justice Black voted with the majority. Thus a simple and yet
concise book which is designed for the layman should be welcomed
by all.
The author resorts to a very clever method to demonstrate that
the justices labor long and hard to render fair decisions. He chooses
six capital cases which quite deftly illustrate his point. Prettyman
dramatizes the fact situation in each case so that the reader is almost
hypnotized, and while the reader is in a state of shock, he painlessly
inserts what would normally be boring material about Court processes. While deeply involved in six of the most interesting cases
on record, the author sneaks in the fact that; (1) the Supreme Court
has a basketball court; (2) that Justice Black plays tennis; (3) that
Monday is decision day, and that the judges read the opinions orally;
(4) that Justice Warren's father was murdered; and (5) that it
takes four affirmative votes for certiorari to be granted.
But the most ingenious quality is Prettyman's illustration of the
human feelings and emotions of the judges, and the soul searching
way in which they render a vote on a case. There could be no
better way to illustrate these qualities than to investigate death and
its relation to the Court. When a judge sees the words "Capital
Case" written across the brief he gives it his deepest undivided attention for he knows that he is bargaining with the grim reaper.
The six cases chosen for close study by the author come from
wide and varied circumstances. Prettyman takes the reader to Alabama for a rape case, to Washington, D.C., for an arson case, to
Louisiana for a case involving cruel and unusual punishment elements, to Washington again for a case involving self defense, to
California for facts in which a law student murdered his mistress,
and finally to Georgia where a Negro was executed for murder after
being convicted by a jury which was unconstitutionally selected.
Though the facts of each case are different, there is something hauntingly similar about them. Each case, of course, has been through
all available channels before coming to the Supreme Court on certiorari. In all six cases mere chance and accident play an important
role. But most important, each case finds a Court overburdened
with work, but which willingly lays the work aside to consider the
new case. It is quite obvious to the reader that the capital case is
by far the most important one to the Court.
In his conclusion the author quite expertly combines his main
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themes of the decision processes of the Court and the very humanitarian element involved, and the inhumanity of man to man in his
insistence upon capital punishment. The last three paragraphs in
the book neatly package the thoughts and ideas, and place in a nut
shell the message of Barrett Prettyman, Jr.
[I]n this frightening time of cheap life-the fact is that an
active ingredient in the workings of one branch of the most
powerful government on earth is compassion. Compassion
for the fate of solitary people, of desperate, lonely, untutored,
and disturbed people. Compassion for human life regardless
of its extrinsic worth.
Is this feeling, shared in varying degrees by all members
of the Supreme Court merely 'some fastidious squeamishness
or private sentimentalism'?
I think not. I think that in the long pull of humanity one
of the phenomena most proudly recorded will be this extraordinary attempt hardly articulated and yet forcefully manifest,
to enhance human dignity through the protection of human
life.
WADE M.

SMITH

The Least Dangerous Branch, The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics. By Alexander M. Bickel. Indianapolis: The BobbsMerrill Co., 1962. Pp. 303. $2.95.
Judicial review has often been looked upon as a variant institution in our American democracy. Referring to this as the "countermajoritarian difficulty," Mr. Bickel, a professor of law at Yale University, has attempted in this volume to justify a rationale of the
institution as compatible with democratic theory. Recognizing that
"on the supreme occasion" when a rule of principle enunciated by
the Supreme Court conflicts with the deeply held and continuing will
of the majority, "the principle of self-rule must apply,"' the author
nevertheless contends that judicial review, properly understood, is
in fact a bulwark of our system. The conflict with democracy is
seen to be more apparent than real.
Professor Bickel views the function of the Supreme Court in
'BICKEL,

THE LEAST DANGEROUS

BRANCH,

THE SUPREME COURT AT

THE BAR or PoLiTics 261 (1962) [hereinafter cited as BICKEL].
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exercising judicial review as on somewhat of a scale, ranging in
importance as to the constitutional system from a denial of certiorari
on the one end, to a constitutional decision of the magnitude of the
school segregation case' on the other. The various devices and doctrines used by the Court to postpone constitutional adjudication, or,
as some would put it, dodge the issue, are dealt with at some length.3
These "methods of not doing," referred to as the "passive virtues,"
are thought to play a vitally important part in the Court's interaction
with the political branches of government.' The instigation of such
interaction, or colloquy, it is argued, is among the foremost virtues
of the system of judicial review.
The ideas on the nature and function of judicial review expressed
by the author are clearly based on his view of the nature of the Constitution itself. And, in Professor Bickel's view, the Constitution,
basic law though it be, is merely a loose framework for government,
the meaning of which changes as principles and conceptions of the
good society "advance" over the years.
Thus, there is no justification for the "literalist," or "strict constructionist," approach to constitutional interpretation, and a substantial portion of the book is devoted to arguing the inadmissibility
of such approach. Beginning with John Marshall's opinion in
Marbury v. Madison,' the rationale of which is soundly criticized, 6
Professor Bickel eloquently attacks the classic view that judicial
review consists of laying the statute in question alongside the pertinent constitutional provision, and invalidating the former when it
does not square with the latter.
Rather, judicial review is seen as a more intricate and sophisticated process, in the course of which the justices "extract fundamental principles and presuppositions from their deepest selves, but
in fact from the evolving morality of our tradition. ' 7 The justices
'Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
'For example, the doctrines of ripeness, standing, deseutude, and "politi-

cal question" are considered in considerable detail, in connection with cases in
which they were utilized, or should have been in the opinion of the author,
in chapter four.
'In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), the Court declined to reach the
merits of a constitutional issue concerning the government's right to deny

passports to certain individuals. Professor Bickel "regards this action as an
example of the Court's practice of often remanding a difficult issue to Congress, in the hope of clarifying it and reaching a workable solution.

'5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
°BICKEL 2-14.
Id. at 326.
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are to be allowed substantial leeway in deciding when and how to
determine the meaning of the Constitution.
Thus, it is frankly admitted that the framers of the fourteenth
amendment had no intention of abolishing school segregation.8 But
no matter-as the mores of society change, the Constitution changes
along with them. One may inquire as to when the transformation
took place. Was it in 1896, or in 1954, or at some date in between?
It should be noted that Professor Bickel does not think that the
decision in Plessy v. Fergusor9 was wrong. The error consisted
of legitimating school segregation by holding it to be constitutional
in a principled constitutional decision, rather than merely tolerating
it as a temporary expedient, through the use of one of the "devices
of the mediating way between legitimation and denial of legislative
power."' 0
Similarly, the author believes that, one day, when the mores of
society "advance" sufficiently, the Court may send capital punishment
to join school segregation in its judicial limbo. "[O]nly a shortsighted and rather imprisoned lawyer would maintain that capital
punishment can never be declared unconstitutional.""
Accordingly, Professor Bickel rejects and attempts to demolish
Professor Herbert Wechsler's conception of neutral principles of
constitutional law.' 2 Such a theory is, of course, incompatible with
the latitudinarian approach to constitutional interpretation adopted
by the author. Professor Wechsler's critique of school segregation
case 13 poses no problem for him. The logical inconsistencies of that
case, so well brought out by Wechsler, are not relevant, or are based
on a misunderstanding. No matter that the Court cannot, or will
not, apply the principle implicit there across the board. Segregation
is wrong on principle, and it must therefore go. But when racial
classification is used to further the ideal of racial equality as, for
example, in the case of a benevolent housing quota, the Court should,
according to Professor Bickel, take the road of expediency and let
it stand.'" The same result, he believes, should also follow where a
RId. at 100.
1 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
oBICKEL 71.
11
Id. at 241.
2 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Conslitutional Law, 73
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
' Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
BICKEL 71.
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principled decision would increase the difficulty of the implementation
of a more important principled goal of the Court.'"
The difficulty is that Professor Bickel never quite succeeds in
coming to grips with the essential problem which he sets out to meet.
The counter-majoritarian principle of judicial review can never be
reconciled with democracy, as such, and it was never intended, of
course, to be so reconciled. Judicial review has its proper justification as a check on democracy, through which the Supreme Court can
interpose the will of the people, as set out in the Constitution, against
the will of a temporary majority, as reflected by the statute or action
being reviewed, thus preserving the fundamental law against the
vicissitudes of current political passions.
But this justification is not sufficiently valid unless the Constitution is to be interpreted on the basis of its wording and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom. Professor Bickel admits that one justice's presuppositions are not another's.' 6 If the justices are to be
permitted, and even encouraged, to bring their own subjective
thoughts to bear on the determination of constitutional issues irrespective of the intent of the framers, then is not the Court, in fact,
disregarding all sophistries and setting itself up as a non-elective legislature? And if constitutional issues are to be decided without recourse to a settled Constitution, and without regard to what Professor Wechsler refers to as "neutral principles" of adjudication,
then should not such subjective judgment be more properly left to
a responsible legislature? A Court as bereft of fixed moorings as
Professor Bickel would have it is an irresponsible body in the truest
sense of that term.
The crux of Professor Bickel's problem, then, is that while he
is seeking justification for judicial review, he chooses a theory of
constitutional interpretation which renders judicial review incompatible with the political institutions of the American Republic. The
view that the framers of the Constitution put meaning into the words
they carefully chose, and intended such meaning to last as long as
the document itself, is the only view which can support judicial
" For example, he approves of the decision in Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S.
985 (1956), in which the Court dismissed without opinion an appeal con-

cerning the constitutionality of Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute. The

reason for this action was not based on law, but on the feeling that to declare that states could not prohibit racial intermarriage would hinder implementation of school integration. BICKEL 174.
28 Id. at 238.
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review as so compatible. If the judicial review is, as Professor Bickel
properly points out, the power to check the will of the political institutions or the people "now and for an indeterminate future,"1 7 such
power must itself be checked by fixed meanings and standards.
As befits a former law clerk to, and disciple of, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Professor Bickel's reasoning ability and his articulation of his
concepts are of the highest caliber. His book is a significant contribution to the recent literature on the Supreme Court, and opponents
as well as supporters of his thesis will find it of considerable interest
and value.
MICHAEL D. JAFFE
1'Id. at 202-03.

